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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

DONALD KITCHEN,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900307-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute, a
second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)
(1990) .
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2 ) (f ) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did defendant preserve his state constitutional

challenges to the roadblock for appellate review?
2.

Did defendant preserve for appellate review the

issue of whether the roadblock violated the state and federal
constitutions "because it was not justified by demonstrated need
nor properly regulated?"
3.

Was the roadblock challenged by defendant

unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful because there is no
express statutory authorization for roadblocks?

4.

Did the warrantless search of defendant's luggage

incident to the roadblock stop violate the fourth amendment?
The factual findings underlying the trial court's
ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal
unless they are clearly erroneous; however, in assessing the
trial court's legal conclusions based on its factual findings,
the appellate court applies a "correction of error" standard of
review.

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.),

cert, granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1989).

Accord United States

v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir. 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Donald Kitchen, was charged with possession
of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to disribute, a
second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann* § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)
(1990) (R. 4).
After the trial court denied defendant's motion to
suppress evidence seized incident to the stop of defendant at a
roadblock, the case was submitted to the court for a
determination of guilt on the evidence developed at the
suppression hearing.

Based on that evidence, the court found

defendant guilty as charged (R. 54).
The court sentenced defendant to a term of one to
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, fined him $1,250, and
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ordered him to pay certain sums to the Victim's Reparation Fund
and the Substance Abuse Prevention Account (R. 55). Execution of
the prison term was suspended and defendant was placed on
probation (R. 55-56).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of the issues raised on appeal, the
pertinent facts are those set out in the trial court's ruling,
which defendant does not challenge (see Ruling at R. 26-29) (a
copy of which is contained in the Addendum).

Those findings of

fact are as follows:
1. On Wednesday, May 17, 1989, defendants
were in a vehicle at a roadblock on
Interstate 15 at milepost 220, south of Nephi
in Juab County.
2. Notice of the roadblock had been
published approximately two weeks earlier in
the Provo Daily Herald and the Nephi Times
News. The said roadblock was conducted after
classroom training sessions with officers
from Pleasant Grove, American Fork, Alpine,
Orem, and Utah County and Juab County
Sheriff's Department. Sergeant Mangelson was
the supervising officer on the roadblock.
The roadblock was approved by Jim Utley,
supervisor of Sergeant Mangelson.
3. Approximately thirty-five officers
participated in the roadblock as part of the
training session. There were officers on
each side of the freeway, stopping traffic in
both directions. The said roadblock was a
continuation of the training session and was
conducted for the purpose of checking for
drivers licenses, registration, liability
insurance, auto safety and observations for
any violations of the criminal law including
alcohol and controlled substance abuse.
4. All of the traffic was stopped in both
the north and southbound lanes except for
busses [sic] and tractor trailers. Defendant
Burke believed that some automobiles occupied
by older folks were not stopped but were
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waived through. The other witnesses either
denied this or did not observe any
automobiles that were waived through. The
Court finds that all automobiles and light
trucks were stopped.
5. Three to four signs were set up in each
direction giving notice of the roadblock.
The signs were spaced out over a distance of
approximately one quarter mile from the point
of stopping.
6. Defendant Kitchen was driving his vehicle
(Blazer) south with one passenger, defendant
Burke, when he was stopped at the roadblock.
7. Officer John Lloyd approached defendant's
[sic] vehicle, on the driver's side.
Sergeant Mangelson testified he was directly
behind officer Lloyd observing Lloyd's
conduct, and that he could smell a strong
odor of burnt marijuana coming from the
vehicle. Sergeant Mangelson then moved
closer to the vehicle to make sure of the
odor. He then moved over to the passenger
side of the vehicle and directed a question
to both defendants, "was marijuana in the
vehicle?" Both defendants replied no, there
was not. Sergeant Mangelson asked if he
could look in the vehicle and was told the
defendants were in a hurry to get to Las
Vegas and he could not search the vehicle.
Officer Mangelson told defendant Kitchen to
pull the vehicle over to the side of the
road. Sergeant Mangelson then,-*still being
on the passenger side of the vehicle, asked
the passenger (defendant Burke) to step out.
Sergeant Mangelson then told defendants he
"could smell marijuana, the odor was very
strong. They might just as well give me the
marijuana because I could smell it and I know
it was there." Defendant Kitchen responded
by opening the console and giving Mangelson
two baggies of green material which were
later confirmed to be marijuana. Sergeant
Mangelson further testified that the
passenger (Burke) did not get out of the
vehicle until the vehicle had been driven out
of the coned area. That when the vehicle was
driven out of the coned area and came to a
stop that Burke was asked to get out of the
vehicle and the door opened and he got out.
That Sergeant Mangelson did not look through
the vehicle nor "crawled in the vehicle"
-4-

until Kitchen had actually given him the "two
baggies."
8. Defendant's testimony conflicted with
that of Sergeant Mangelson's as follows:
At a time when the vehicle was first
stopped and before the vehicle was driven out
of the coned area, Kitchen testified: "I
guess Danny's door flew open and I seen him
lunge over like that and because he was
leaning over on it and didn't expect the door
to open and the door opened and Danny just
kind of moved to the side."
Burke testified: "I remember Officer
Mangelson walked around to my side of the
vehicle. He came around the front way and I
was sitting in the vehicle, he opened the
door and asked me for identification." After
the vehicle had been pulled over to the
shoulder of the road, Burke testified: "I
got out and he still had my driver's license
and I don't believe he said anything else to
me at that time. He looked in the car and I
believe Don was still sitting in the vehicle
in the driver's side."
9. Sergeant Mangelson placed the defendants
under arrest and read them their Miranda
rights immediately following Kitchen's giving
the baggies of marijuana to Sergeant
Mangelson.
10. Subsequent to defendant Kitchen giving
the marijuana to Sergeant Mangelson, Sergeant
Mangelson looked through the interior of the
vehicle and found in the console a small vile
[sic] which contained a white powder which
appeared to be cocaine and later tested out
to be cocaine. Officer Mangelson asked
defendant Kitchen what the white powder was
and Kitchen did not respond. Officer
Mangelson observed a bulge in Kitchen's
pocket and inquired what it was. Kitchen
said it was $2,000.00 and was asked to
deliver it to Officer Mangelson. The sum of
money delivered exceeded $2,000.00.
Officer Mangelson continued his search
of the vehicle and found a container with
marijuana roaches. Behind the back seat of
the Blazer vehicle there were three suitcases
which the officers searched, and in one
suitcase there was a J.C. Penney bag which
contained twenty-seven ounces of cocaine.
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(R. 26-29).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not err in denying defendant's
motion to suppress.

Under Utah statutory law, the police have

implicit authority to set up the roadblock at issue in this case.
Defendant's state constitutional challenges to the
roadblock should not be considered by this Court on appeal
because they were not adequately developed b€>low.
Nor did defendant preserve for appellate review the
issue of whether the roadblock violated the state and federal
constitutions "because it was not justified by demonstrated need
nor properly regulated."
The warrantless search of defendant's suitcase was
lawful under the automobile exception to the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE
ROADBLOCK BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT ADEQUATELY
DEVELOPED BELOW.
In his memorandum filed in support of his motion to
suppress in the trial court, defendant made only passing
references to article I# section 14 of the Utah Constitution (R.
14-22).

He did not set forth any analysis independent of fourth

amendment analysis to support his claim that the roadblock in
this case violated the state constitution.

Because defendant's

state constitutional arguments were not adequately developed in
the trial court, this Court should not consider them for the
-6-

first time on appeal.

See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28

(Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1989).

See

also State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1062 n.l (Utah 1989); State
v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 n.4 (Utah Ct. App.), petition for
cert, filed, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 78 (Utah 1990); State v. Arroyo,
770 P.2d 153, 154 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989), reversed on other
grounds, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
POINT II
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE FOR APPELLATE
REVIEW THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE ROADBLOCK
VIOLATED THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS
"BECAUSE IT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY DEMONSTRATED
NEED NOR PROPERLY REGULATED."
Defendant argues that, even if it were assumed that
roadblocks in the abstract are constitutional, the roadblock in
the instant case violated the state and federal constitutions
"because it was not justified by demonstrated need nor properly
regulated."

However, because defendant did not present this

argument to the trial court as a ground for suppressing the
evidence, he is precluded from raising it-for the first time on
appeal.

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985).1

Defendant does not make a general challenge to the type of
roadblock set up in this case (i.e., a roadblock whose primary
purpose was for checking driver's license, vehicle registration,
and proof of insurance). However, it is noteworthy that the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed its position
that this type of roadblock does not violate the fourth
amendment. United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 202
(10th Cir. 1990) (decided after the United States Supreme Court
had issued its opinion in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz,
110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), which upheld Michigan's sobriety
checkpoint program against a fourth amendment challenge). Cf.
Simmons v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 380 S.E.2d 656 (1989)
(holding that the manner in which a driver's license/equipment
roadblock was conducted violated the fourth amendment).
-7-

POINT III
THE ABSENCE OF EXPRESS STATUTORY
AUTHORIZATION FOR THE ROADBLOCK AT WHICH
DEFENDANT WAS STOPPED DOES NOT RENDER THE
ROADBLOCK UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR OTHERWISE
UNLAWFUL; NOR DO UTAH CODE ANN. §S 41-1-17
(1988) AND 77-7-15 (1990) LIMIT THE AUTHORITY
OF OFFICERS TO STOP VEHICLES TO SITUATIONS
WHERE THEY HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT
EITHER THE VEHICLE OR ONE OF ITS OCCUPANTS
HAS VIOLATED OR IS VIOLATING THE LAW.
Defendant argues that the roadblock at which he was
stopped was unconstitutional because (1) the legislature has not
expressly or impliedly authorized such roadblocks, and (2) the
legislature has specifically limited a police officer's authority
to stop a vehicle for administrative or investigatory purposes to
those situations where the officer has at least a reasonable
suspicion that either the vehicle or one of its occupants has
violated or is violating the law.

Each of these contentions will

be addressed separately.
Defendant argues that the roadblock in this case could
not be constitutional unless there is either express or implied
statutory authority to set up such roadblocks.

Although it is

not clear that the absence of express or implied statutory
authority would render the roadblock unconstitutional, as opposed
to simply unlawful, see, e.g., Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97,
102 n.2, 743 P.2d 692, 695 n.2 (1987) ("We have often stressed
the need to examine statutory authority and the limitations
imposed by that authority before reaching any constitutional
question."), there is implied authority in Utah's statutes for
roadblocks set up for law enforcement purposes.

The State agrees

with defendant's conclusion that there is no express statutory
•8-

authority for the type of roadblock at issue here.

£f. Utah Code

Ann. S 23-20-19 (1984) (referring to roadblocks and checking
stations set up by Division of Wildlife Resources).
The legislature has granted peace officers broad
authority to enforce the laws of this state.

For example, the

Utah Highway Patrol is statutorily authorized to "enforce the
state laws and rules governing use of the highways" and to
"regulate traffic on all highways and roads of the state."
Code Ann. S 27-10-4(a) & (b) (1989).

Utah

The authority of municipal

police officers is set forth in Utah Code Ann. S 10-3-914(1)
(Supp. 1990):
Within the boundaries of the municipality,
police officers have the same authority as
deputy sheriffs, including at all times the
authority to preserve the public peace,
prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders,
suppress riots, protect persons and property,
remove nuisances existing in the public
streets, roads, and highways, enforce every
law relating to the suppression of offenses,
and perform all duties required of them by
ordinance or resolution.
Similar statutes relate to the duties of the sheriff and the
sheriff's deputies, Utah Code Ann. S 17-22-2 (Supp. 1990), and
the duties of peace officers generally to enforce the provisions
of the Motor Vehicle Act, Utah Code Ann. S 41-1-17 (1988).

These

statutes are most reasonably read as giving peace officers broad
authority to engage in any law enforcement practice that is
constitutional, unless some specific statutory restriction
exists.

As the Appellate Court of Illinois correctly concluded

in rejecting an argument similar to that advanced by defendant
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here:
Criminal statutes do contain an implied
right of police to enforce them. While there
are state and federal constitutional
limitations on the means of enforcement,
these limits are constitutional and not
inherent in every criminal statute. The
State has passed laws requiring safety
equipment. Absent evidence of some contrary
intent, the police should be able to enforce
those laws in a constitutional manner.

We are loath to say that the State has
anything but a strong interest in seeing that
all motor vehicles are safe, and given the
absence of any intent to provide otherwise,
the safety equipment statutes carry with them
an implied right of the officers to inspect
autos in any constitutional manner.
People v. Estrada, 68 Ill.App.3d 272, 24 111.Dec. 924, 386 N.E.2d
128, 133-34 (1979) (upholding vehicle safety equipment
checkpoint), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979).

Although

defendant cites contrary authority, Nelson v. Lane County, 304
Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 (1987); State v. Boyanovsky, 304 Or. 131,
743 P.2d 711 (1987); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okl. Cr.
2
1984) , the better view is that expressed in Estrada and the
dissenting opinion in Nelson, 304 Or. at 128, 743 P.2d at 710
(Peterson, C.J., dissenting).

There are numerous law enforcement

practices involving searches or seizures which have been
Defendant also cites State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756
P.2d 1057 (1988), in support of his position; however, that case
is distinguishable from the other cases he cites, in that the
Idaho Legislature explicitly limited the use of roadblocks to
situations where officers desired to Mapprehend[] persons
reasonably believed by such officers to be wanted for violation
of the laws of this state, of any other state, or of the United
States[.]M Idk at 1061 (quoting Idaho Code S 19-621) (emphasis
in original).
-10-

recognized by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court as
constitutionally permissible and otherwise proper even though
there is no explicit statutory authority for the particular
practice.

See, e.g.# State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 993 (Utah

1989) (recognizing plain view doctrine which allows an officer to
seize evidence without a warrant if the officer is lawfully
present and has probable cause to believe the item is evidence of
a crime); State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986)
(recognizing search incident to arrest exception to the fourth
amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements); State v. ,.
Hyqh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (holding that inventory
searches are permitted under the fourth amendment and article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution); State v. Droneburg, 781
P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing the automobile
exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement).

In

short, the most appropriate initial inquiry with respect to any
law enforcement practice is to ask whether it is constitutional,
not whether it is explicitly authorized by statute.

While the

particular practice must impliedly be within the statutory
authority of a peace officer, explicit authority should not be
required.

Of course, if a statute expressly prohibits a

particular practice or limits its use to certain circumstances, a
constitutional practice would be unlawful if it were not within
the statutory restrictions.
Defendant attacks the notion that peace officers in
Utah have implied statutory authority to use roadblocks on the
ground that police authority to stop vehicles and their occupants
has been expressly limited by the legislature in Utah Code Ann.
-11-

S 41-1-17 (1988) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990).

Section

41-1-17 provides in pertinent part:
[P]eace officers [and] state patrolmen . .
. shall have power and it shall be their
duty:
(c) When on duty, upon reasonable belief
that any vehicle is being operated in
violation of any provision of this act or of
any law regulating the operation of vehicles
to require the driver thereof to stop,
exhibit his driver's license and the
registration card issued for the vehicles
[sic] and submit to an inspection of such
vehicle, the registration plates and
registration card thereon.
Section 77-7-15 states:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
Defendant reads these provisions as limitations on an officer's
authority to make a stop of a vehicle or its occupants.

However,

this Court has consistently viewed section 77-7-15 as merely a
codification of the constitutional standard for an investigatory
stop enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

See, e.g. ,

State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v.
Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Although neither

this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has had occasion to
construe section 41-1-17, that provision appears to be nothing
more than a codification of the constitutional standard for an
investigatory stop of a vehicle set forth in Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979) (under the fourth amendment, to lawfully stop
a vehicle for investigatory purposes, an officer must have at
-12-

least a reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an
occupant has violated or is about to violate the law--i.e., a
traffic or equipment regulation, or any applicable criminal law).
Thus# it is no surprise that Utah's appellate courts have
consistently applied the Prouse standard in evaluating the
validity of a particular vehicle stop, without any reference to
section 41-1-17.

See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302, 1304

(Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); State v. Baird, 763
P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
In sum, sections 77-7-15 and 41-1-17 are not reasonably
read as defining the only circumstances in which an officer may
stop a vehicle or its occupants; they merely codify established
constitutional standards without prohibiting other police conduct
that, although outside the scope of these statutory provisions,
is nevertheless constitutional.
POINT IV
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S
SUITCASE WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE
EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S WARRANT
REQUIREMENT.
Defendant argues that the warrantless search of his
suitcase inside his vehicle violated the fourth amendment.

His

claim can be disposed of summarily.
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's
conclusion that there was probable cause to believe that there
was contraband in his vehicle.

Br. of Appellant at 39. Rather,

he focuses on the question of whether there were exigent
circumstances to justify the warrantless search of his vehicle
and suitcase.

He relies solely on the state constitutional
-13-

analysis engaged in by two justices in State v. Larocco/ 794 P.2d
460, 467-71 (Utah 1990) (Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman, J.;
Stewart, J., concurring in the result), where the lead opinion
essentially rejects the automobile exception to the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement developed by the United States
Supreme Court, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); California v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386 (1985).

Because defendant did not make this state

constitutional argument below, it should not be considered by
this Court.

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d at 660; State v. Johnson,

771 P.2d at 327.
Defendant does not claim the search of his suitcase
violated the fourth amendment.

Indeed, that search was justified

under the automobile exception recognized in Carroll and
Chambers.

See also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)

(where police officers have probable cause to search an entire
vehicle, they may conduct a warrantless search of every part of
the vehicle and its contents, including all containers and
packages, that may conceal the object of the search).

-14-

CONCLUSION
BaBed on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm both the denial of defendant's motion to suppress and his
conviction.
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